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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
 
 In 2008, Appellee Borough of Shickshinny 
(“Shickshinny”) approved placement of a religious-themed 
sign on municipal property near the home of Appellant 
Francene Tearpock-Martini (“Tearpock-Martini”).  In 2012, 
Tearpock-Martini brought this civil rights action, challenging 
the placement of the sign as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States.  At issue in this appeal is whether an 
Establishment Clause challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to a 
still-existing monument erected on municipal property is 
subject to a state-law statute of limitations.  We hold that it is 
not.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s ruling 
that the Establishment Clause challenge advanced by 
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Tearpock-Martini is time-barred.  With respect to her other 
claims—that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow her to erect 
her own nearby sign violated her rights to free speech and 
equal protection of the law—we conclude that Pennsylvania’s 
statute of limitations does apply, and will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of those claims on limitations grounds. 
I.  
 Tearpock-Martini, a resident of Shickshinny, 
Pennsylvania, owns property situated at the intersection of 
South Main Street and Furnace Street.
1
  In 2008, a local 
pastor sought to place a directional sign for his church near 
her property.  Tearpock-Martini objected.  At an August 2008 
meeting, the Shickshinny Borough Council voted to approve 
the installation of the sign on the Borough’s right of way 
bordering Tearpock-Martini’s property.2  On August 18, 
2008, Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: 
“Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!”  It has a directional 
arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross 
and a white Bible. 
                                              
1
 Our recitation of the factual background is derived 
from Tearpock-Martini’s Amended Complaint.  For purposes 
of this appeal, we accept as true all facts set forth therein, and 
draw all reasonable inferences from such allegations in favor 
of the complainant.  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 
F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). 
2
 Appellees Jule Moore, Michael Steeber, Rosalie 
Whitebread, and James Wido are Borough Council members 
who voted to approve the sign. 
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To protest the placement of the sign, Tearpock-Martini 
installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, 
a posting of her own, which read: “This Church Sign Violates 
My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner.  Residential 
Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!”  
Shickshinny, by way of a letter and also a verbal warning 
from its Code Enforcement Officer, told Tearpock-Martini 
that she could be charged with summary offenses if she did 
not remove her sign.  Tearpock-Martini evidently removed 
her sign in response to these threats.
3
  At some unspecified 
time thereafter, the town reinforced the installation of the 
church sign using heavy equipment and poured concrete. 
In November 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil 
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  She later filed 
a three-count Amended Complaint.  Count One asserts an 
Equal Protection claim based upon the refusal to allow her to 
erect her own sign; Count Two asserts that Appellees 
violated, and continue to violate, the Establishment Clause by 
authorizing the installation and ongoing presence of the 
church sign; and Count Three avers that Appellees violated 
the First Amendment by threatening to prosecute Tearpock-
Martini for installation of her own sign.  She seeks injunctive 
relief consisting of removal of the church sign, as well as 
damages. 
Appellees moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
based on, among other things, Pennsylvania’s two-year 
statute of limitations for tort claims.  In a Memorandum and 
                                              
3
 Although the Amended Complaint itself is unclear on 
this point, Shickshinny seems to concede as much in its 
briefing.  Appellees’ Br. at 19. 
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Order entered August 19, 2013, the District Court found that 
Tearpock-Martini’s claims were time-barred, and granted the 
motion to dismiss.  Tearpock-Martini filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) is de novo.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III.  
 The Establishment Clause, which states that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion[,]” 
U.S. Const. amend. I, prevents any branch of federal, state, or 
municipal government from “act[ing] with the ostensible and 
predominant purpose of advancing religion . . . .”  McCreary 
Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).  
Although the precise contours of that command have 
historically resisted definition even by our highest Court,
4
 it is 
                                              
4
 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing the plurality 
opinion as “accurately reflect[ing] our current Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence—or at least the Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence we currently apply some of the time.”); Utah 
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 17–
19 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(noting that the display on government property of a crèche, 
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undisputed that religious displays erected by the State, 
whether enduring or only temporary, may sometimes stand in 
violation of the Constitution.  See, e.g., id. at 881 (concluding 
that courthouse display of the Ten Commandments violated 
the Establishment Clause). 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, is the vehicle by which an individual may 
sue government officials in tort for violations of 
constitutional rights, including those arising under the 
Establishment Clause.
5
  Although federal law provides no 
                                                                                                     
menorah, the Ten Commandments, or a cross “violates the 
Establishment Clause, except when it doesn’t.”). 
5
 In pertinent part, the statute reads: 
Every person who, under color of 
any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . . 
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statute of limitations for actions brought under § 1983, state 
law may provide a limitations period “if it is not inconsistent 
with federal law or policy to do so.”  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 
U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988), 
superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a); 
see also Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Because the Supreme Court has clarified that “all § 
1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations 
purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the 
person[,]” Springfield Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Knoll, 471 U.S. 288, 
289 (1985), the ostensibly applicable term here is 
Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period applicable to tort 
claims, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7).
6
  The date of 
                                                                                                     
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
6
 In pertinent part, the statute reads: 
The following actions and 
proceedings must be commenced 
within two years: 
(7) Any other action or 
proceeding to recover damages 
for injury to person or property 
which is founded on negligent, 
intentional, or otherwise tortious 
conduct or any other action or 
proceeding sounding in trespass, 
including deceit or fraud, except 
an action or proceeding subject to 
another limitation specified in this 
subchapter. 
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the claim’s accrual, however, continues to be governed by 
federal law, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), 
although state law generally governs tolling and its effects, 
see Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 655 (1983). 
Tearpock-Martini does not dispute that more than two 
years elapsed between the installation of the church sign by 
Appellees and the commencement of her lawsuit.
7
  Instead, 
she invokes the continuing-violation doctrine, which “is an 
‘equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.’”  
Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 
1995)).  In brief, the rule provides that “when a defendant's 
conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so 
long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls 
within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court 
will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would 
otherwise be time barred.”  Brenner v. Local 514, United 
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 
(3d Cir. 1991).  The doctrine’s focus “is on affirmative acts of 
the defendants.”  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293. 
                                                                                                     
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7). 
7
 Nor does she allege or argue that Appellees’ 
reinstallation of the church sign occurred within two years of 
the complaint.  And although the Amended Complaint states 
that Appellees “repeatedly ratify their installation and 
maintenance of the sign at Shickshinny Borough meetings[,]” 
(App. 24), Tearpock-Martini does not explain the import of 
this conclusory statement. 
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The reach of this doctrine is understandably narrow.  
We have often applied it in employment discrimination cases, 
where only in retrospect will a plaintiff recognize that 
seemingly unconnected incidents were, in fact, part and 
parcel of a larger discriminatory pattern.  See Mandel v. M & 
Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165–67 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002)).  Under such circumstances, equity demands that so 
long as the most recent offensive utterance or adverse action 
occurred within the limitations period, the entire scope of that 
continuing violation may be considered.  Id.  We have 
cautioned, however, that equitable relief from the statutory 
limitations period is appropriate only where the alleged 
violation is “‘occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not 
continual ill effects from an original violation.’”  Cowell, 263 
F.3d at 293 (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare Cnty. Bd. of 
Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)).
8
 
The only cases lending credence to Tearpock-Martini’s 
theory that a monument which contravenes the Establishment 
Clause is a continuing act giving rise to a newly accrued right 
on each day of its existence, as opposed to a continuing effect 
of the original installation, come from the Seventh Circuit.  In 
Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 800 F. Supp. 
676, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1992), the district court considered the 
                                              
8
 Were it not for this sensible limitation, the exception 
might swallow the rule.  A financial harm, physical trauma, or 
injury to reputation, for instance, will often follow a plaintiff 
long after the unlawful act itself.  As a corollary, we have 
held that a government official’s refusal to undo or correct 
such harm is not an affirmative act for purposes of 
establishing a continuing violation.  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293. 
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constitutionality of a monument installed in 1955 and 
challenged 30 years later.  The court, despite ultimately 
finding no Establishment Clause violation, declined to apply 
the statute of limitations, explaining that “as each day there is 
a violation, each day [the plaintiff’s] cause of action accrues.”  
Id.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding, 
without disturbing the district court’s limitations ruling, that 
the monument did violate the Establishment Clause.  See 
Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cnty., 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
Years later, in Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592 
(7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit revisited its Gonzales 
opinion in dicta.  The Pitts plaintiffs argued that the city had 
violated their First Amendment rights by placing defamatory 
signs on their property in retaliation for certain protected 
speech.  The panel rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
continuing-violation doctrine applied, in part by 
distinguishing the plaintiffs’ claims from an Establishment 
Clause violation: 
The First Amendment’s command 
that there be no establishment of 
religion stands on a different 
footing from a private individual’s 
interest in avoiding defamation.  
All citizens have an interest in 
preventing government from 
sponsoring one particular religion, 
however worthy the tenets of that 
faith may be.  Indeed, it might not 
be too much to say that an 
important part of the reason why 
the United States has been 
11 
 
fortunate enough to escape most 
of the religious conflict that has 
plagued other parts of the world is 
that the Constitution itself 
demands that the government 
maintain a position of absolute 
neutrality among religions.  
Potential violations of this 
principle may not be obvious, 
however, to those who share a 
common background.  In a 
predominantly Christian 
community, it may take a 
Buddhist, or a [Muslim], or a Jew, 
or an atheist, to call to the 
authorities’ attention a possible 
violation of the Establishment 
Clause.  The rights of such 
citizens do not expire simply 
because a monument has been 
comfortably unchallenged for 
twenty years, or fifty years, or a 
hundred years.  Each day, as our 
own opinion in Gonzales 
implicitly recognized, brings a 
new duty on the government's 
part, and a corresponding new 
right to seek vindication of the 
constitutional right in question. 
Id. at 596. 
We take no issue with the Seventh Circuit’s emphatic 
pronouncement that Establishment Clause claims ultimately 
12 
 
are not subject to dismissal under a state statute of limitations.  
But nothing in the reasoning of either Gonzales or Pitts 
suggests why the continuing-violation doctrine provides a 
coherent basis for that conclusion.  Many allegedly 
unconstitutional state actions set in motion a lasting 
consequence which, to an injured plaintiff, might continue to 
invite vindication.  But as we recognized in Cowell, to elide 
the distinction between affirmative acts and effects would be 
to extend indefinitely the date of accrual for all constitutional 
claims predicated upon state takings, denial of business 
permits, zoning decisions, and any other manner of state 
action carrying long-term repercussions. 
Instead we find ourselves in agreement with the simple 
logic advanced by Appellees: (1) the last affirmative act taken 
by Shickshinny was the physical installation of the sign itself, 
which occurred outside the limitations period; (2) the 
continued presence of the sign is merely an effect of that 
action; (3) the continuing-violation doctrine does not apply.  
Like the District Court, which concluded that Appellees 
“ha[ve] committed no acts within the two years of the filing 
of plaintiff’s complaint,” (App. 12), we too conclude that the 
continuing-violation doctrine does not apply on these facts. 
IV.  
When an issue is properly before us, we are “not 
limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the 
parties, but rather retain[] the independent power to identify 
and apply the proper construction of governing law.”  Kamen 
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (citing 
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)); see also 
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 
408, 413 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012).  Here, we find Pennsylvania’s 
13 
 
statute of limitations inapplicable to Tearpock-Martini’s 
claim for a reason other than the one she offers. 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Wilson, 471 
U.S. at 267, and as we touched upon earlier, federal law 
incorporates state law for purposes of certain interstitial 
“rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims . . . .”  Such 
incorporation by reference, however, is not automatic, and 
instead requires a three-step analysis: 
First, courts are to look to the 
laws of the United States “so far 
as such laws are suitable to carry 
[the civil and criminal civil rights 
statutes] into effect.”  [42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(a).
9
]  If no suitable federal 
                                              
9
 In pertinent part, the statute reads: 
The jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal matters conferred on the 
district courts . . . for the 
protection of all persons in the 
United States in their civil rights, 
and for their vindication, shall be 
exercised and enforced in 
conformity with the laws of the 
United States, so far as such laws 
are suitable to carry the same into 
effect; but in all cases where they 
are not adapted to the object, or 
are deficient in the provisions 
necessary to furnish suitable 
remedies and punish offenses 
14 
 
rule exists, courts undertake the 
second step by considering 
application of state “common law, 
as modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes” of the 
forum state.  Ibid.  A third step 
asserts the predominance of the 
federal interest: courts are to 
apply state law only if it is not 
“inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”  Ibid. 
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1984).  The first two 
steps are not in dispute: because § 1983 lacks a limitations 
period, we turn to Pennsylvania’s statutory rule.  The third 
step, upon which we now focus, compels us to apply that rule 
                                                                                                     
against law, the common law, as 
modified and changed by the 
constitution and statutes of the 
State wherein the court having 
jurisdiction of such civil or 
criminal cause is held, so far as 
the same is not inconsistent with 
the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, shall be extended to 
and govern the said courts in the 
trial and disposition of the cause . 
. . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). 
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unless it would be “inconsistent with federal law or policy to 
do so.”  Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266–67. 
 We thus consider the significance of the federal rights 
implicated by an Establishment Clause claim.  Perhaps the 
most readily apparent factor on this point is the Clause’s 
standing in the first line of the Bill of Rights.  See U.S. Const. 
amend. I.  The Supreme Court, too, despite a fractious debate 
over the scope of the substantive rights conveyed, has 
reiterated the importance of the Clause time and again: “It is 
settled law that no government official in this Nation may 
violate these fundamental constitutional rights regarding 
matters of conscience.”  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989), abrogated on 
other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 
1811 (2014); Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 
(characterizing Establishment Clause rights as “elemental”). 
Many constitutional rights which are traditionally 
subject to state limitations periods, of course, are of debatably 
equal or even greater significance.  But what further 
distinguishes Tearpock-Martini’s claim, and Establishment 
Clause claims in general, is that the traditional rationales 
justifying a limitations period—“to protect defendants against 
stale or unduly delayed claims,” “facilitat[e] the 
administration of claims,” and “promot[e] judicial 
efficiency,” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 
U.S. 130, 133 (2008)—simply have no persuasive force in 
this context.  Tearpock-Martini’s challenge is to a still-
existing monument that communicates anew an allegedly 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the government 
each time it is viewed.  Strict application of the statutory 
limitations period both serves no salutary purpose and 
16 
 
threatens to immunize indefinitely the presence of an 
allegedly unconstitutional display.   
Our analysis is bolstered by the fact that we are aware 
of no opinion, aside from that issued by the District Court 
below, to have held that an Establishment Clause violation 
predicated on a still-existing display or practice was time-
barred.  This cannot be for lack of opportunity: high-profile 
challenges to the long-standing public display of religious 
monuments have been routine in recent years.  Although such 
claims sometimes fail on the merits or for other procedural 
reasons, none have been dismissed on limitations grounds.  
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (display 
of Ten Commandments challenged 40 years after 
installation); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 
2008) (monument challenged more than 30 years after 
installation); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017 
(10th Cir. 2008) (city seal challenged after over 40 years in 
use); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000) (statue in Wisconsin 
park challenged after 39 years on site); Harris v. City of Zion, 
Lake Cnty., 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991) (city seal 
challenged after 89 years in use); Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (county 
seal challenged after 60 years in use).  Cases involving 
ongoing practices, too, have been brought long after the 
initiation of the practice at issue without implicating a 
limitations period.  See, e.g., Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 
1816 (prayer at town meeting challenged after 9 years of 
monthly occurrences).  And our own jurisprudence, which 
addresses the question only cursorily, implies that such claims 
are not subject to dismissal under the statute of limitations.  
See, e.g., Freethought Soc’y of Greater Phila. v. Chester 
17 
 
Cnty., 334 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do not 
believe that the defendants have demonstrated that [the 
plaintiff] waived her right to bring this action (or that the 
statute of limitations has expired) because she noticed the 
plaque in the 1960s but did not bring an action until 2001.”).10 
 In sum, the significance of the constitutional interests 
at play, the minimal interests advanced by application of a 
limitations period, and the long-standing apparent exemption 
of Establishment Clause claims from such defenses convince 
us that it would be “inconsistent with federal law or policy,” 
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266–67, to apply Pennsylvania’s 
limitations period to Tearpock-Martini’s Establishment 
Clause claim.
11
  Accordingly, we will vacate the dismissal of 
Count Two of the Amended Complaint. 
                                              
10
 Although academic literature on the question 
presented is all but nonexistent, Erwin Chemerinsky, a noted 
constitutional scholar, agrees that the issue is not a matter of 
tolling—instead, the better view is that “there is no statute of 
limitations for Establishment Clause claims.”  Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden 
v. Perry, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 14 (2005). 
11
 It should be plain from this analysis that our logic 
and holding extend only to Establishment Clause claims 
challenging a still-existing display.  Although the question is 
not before us, we expect that Establishment Clause claims 
predicated on discrete incidents would remain subject to any 
applicable state-law limitations period.  See, e.g., Weinstein v. 
U.S. Air Force, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1375 (D.N.M. 2006) 
(dismissing Establishment Clause claim predicated on single 
18 
 
Appellees ask that in the alternative, we consider 
whether Tearpock-Martini’s Establishment Clause claim fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Because 
the District Court has not yet passed on that question, we 
express no opinion on the matter and leave it for resolution 
upon remand. 
V.  
Counts One and Three of the Amended Complaint 
allege that Shickshinny violated the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Free Speech Clause, respectively, when it prohibited 
Tearpock-Martini from installing her own sign in protest of 
the church sign.  As noted above, Tearpock-Martini does not 
allege that this incident occurred within two years of the 
filing of her lawsuit.  Nor does she specifically argue in her 
briefing that the limitations period for these claims, too, 
should be tolled by the continuing-violation doctrine or for 
any other reason. 
We agree with the District Court that these claims, 
which also arise under § 1983, are barred by Pennsylvania’s 
two-year statute of limitations.  See, e.g., Bougher v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78–79 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming 
dismissal of equal protection claims under Pennsylvania 
statute of limitations); O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 
125, 129 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of free speech 
claim under Pennsylvania statute of limitations).  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order of 
                                                                                                     
incident of unwelcome “proselytizing” under New Mexico’s 
six-year limitations period). 
19 
 
August 19, 2013 insofar as it dismisses Counts One and Three 
of the Amended Complaint. 
VI.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate in part the District Court’s ruling, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
